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Wither Zauderer, Blossom Heightened
Scrutiny? How the Supreme Court’s
2018 Rulings in Becerra and Janus
Exacerbate Problems with
Compelled-Speech Jurisprudence
Clay Calvert*
Abstract
This Article examines how the United States Supreme Court’s
2018 decisions in the First Amendment cases of National Institute
of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra and Janus v. American
Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31,
muddle an already disorderly compelled-speech doctrine.
Specifically, dual five-to-four decisions in Becerra and Janus
raise key questions about the level of scrutiny—either a heightened
test or a deferential variant of rational basis review—against
which statutes compelling expression should be measured.
Critically, Becerra illustrates the willingness of the Court’s
conservative Justices to narrowly confine the aging
compelled-speech test from Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel. Furthermore, the Article explores how Justice Clarence
Thomas’s concurrence in a third 2018 decision—Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission—heightens
problems with the compelled-speech doctrine. The Article
concludes by proposing multiple criteria for the Court to consider
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when determining the level of scrutiny to use in compelled-speech
cases.
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I. Introduction
The unenumerated First Amendment1 right not to speak,2
sometimes called “the First Amendment freedom from compelled
expression,”3 once was readily understood. Viewed by the United
1. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press
Clauses were incorporated nearly ninety-five years ago through the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental liberties to apply to state and
local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925) (“[W]e may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press
are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).
2. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002) (“As a
general principle, the First Amendment bars the government from dictating
what we see or read or speak or hear.” (emphasis added)), superseded on other
grounds by statute, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003); see also Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“The right to speak and the right to refrain
from speaking are complementary . . . .”).
3. Howard M. Wasserman, Compelled Expression and the Public Forum
Doctrine, 77 TUL. L. REV. 163, 168 (2002).
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States Supreme Court “as part and parcel of the freedom of
speech,”4 it was rooted in a handful of cases.5 Each was factually
different, but generally extended “robust protection for a right not
to speak.”6
For example, in 1943 the Supreme Court concluded in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette7 that public school
students cannot be forced to pledge allegiance to the United
States and to engage in the symbolic expression8 of saluting the
American flag.9 Justice Robert Jackson famously explained in
Barnette that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein.”10 This precept, Professor Joseph Blocher notes, is
now “a pillar of First Amendment jurisprudence . . . despite the
fact that the amendment’s text says nothing specifically about a
right or freedom not to speak.”11
Later, in its 1977 ruling in Wooley v. Maynard,12 the Court
made it clear that a state cannot compel individuals to display
mottos on government-required license plates that are
4. Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and a Woman’s Right to
Know: Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45 CONN. L.
REV. 595, 618 (2012).
5. See cases cited infra notes 7–19 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s early
First Amendment jurisprudence).
6. Abner S. Greene, “Not in My Name” Claims of Constitutional Right, 98
B.U. L. REV. 1475, 1486 (2018).
7. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
8. See id. at 632
There is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges, the flag salute
is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of
communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some
system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to
mind.
9. See id. at 642 (“We think the action of the local authorities in
compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on
their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose
of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.”).
10. Id.
11. Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV.
1, 19 (2012).
12. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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“repugnant to their moral and religious beliefs.”13 The Court
ruled in favor of a husband and wife who were Jehovah’s
Witnesses and who objected on “moral, religious, and political”
grounds to conveying New Hampshire’s state motto of “Live Free
or Die” on their automobile’s license plate.14 In brief, as Professor
Mark Strasser writes, “Barnette and Wooley both stand for the
proposition that the First Amendment protects the right not to
speak under certain conditions . . . .”15
Additionally, the Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo16 specified forty-five years ago that newspapers are not
obligated to print editorial content to which they object.17
Furthermore, in its 1995 ruling in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group,18 the Court held that private citizens
who organize parades cannot be required by the government to

13. Id. at 707.
14. See id. at 707 n.2 (describing Mr. Maynard’s objections to the state
motto: “I believe that life is more precious than freedom”).
15. Mark A. Strasser, What’s Fair for Conscientious Objectors Subject to
Public Accommodations Laws, 48 N.M. L. REV. 124, 134 (2018). Strasser points
out, however, that both Barnette and Wooley
involved government-prescribed speech, so their applicability in
contexts where the government is not specifying contents of others’
speech is an open question. It is simply unclear whether an important
aspect of the right not to speak jurisprudence is that an individual is
being asked to expressly affirm something contrary to his or her
belief.
Id. at 134–35.
16. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
17. In striking down a Florida right-of-reply statute that granted political
candidates free space in newspapers in the Sunshine State that had criticized or
attacked their records, the Court reasoned:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news,
comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go into a
newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and
content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public
officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of editorial
control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how
governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised
consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they
have evolved to this time.
Id. at 258.
18. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
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include in them “a group imparting a message the organizers do
not wish to convey.”19
Such cases individually are somewhat simple to understand.
Yet as Professor Nat Stern contended in 2011, “the right to resist
governmentally imposed expressive activities has evolved into a
sprawling and ungainly doctrine.”20 That is largely because the
right not to speak has been “[i]nvoked in efforts to thwart
requirements ranging from acceptance of military recruiters at
law school campuses to subsidies for generic advertising of
agricultural products . . . .”21 If it was true eight years ago that
the right not to speak had “lost much of its coherence,”22 then
facets of three 2018 Supreme Court rulings—National Institute of
Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra,23 Janus v. American
Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council
31,24 and Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission25—further clouded the murky waters.
In Becerra, a conservative five-Justice majority26 held that
two compelled-speech obligations affecting religiously affiliated
anti-abortion crisis pregnancy centers27 in California likely
violated the First Amendment.28 One provision mandated that
19. Id. at 559.
20. Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59 BUFF.
L. REV. 847, 849 (2011).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
24. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
25. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
26. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion and was joined
by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy, Samuel Alito,
and Neil Gorsuch. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2367 (identifying the Justices who
joined Thomas in delivering the Court’s opinion).
27. See Adam Liptak, Anti-Abortion Health Clinics Win First Amendment
Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2018, at A1 (describing the centers as “religiously
oriented” facilities that “oppose abortion on religious grounds”); see also Adam
Liptak, Skepticism by the Court for a Law that Requires a Discussion of
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2018, at A13 (“The centers, which are often
affiliated with religious groups, seek to persuade women to carry their
pregnancies to term or to offer their offspring for adoption.”).
28. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2378 (“We hold that petitioners are likely to
succeed on the merits of their claim that the FACT Act violates the First
Amendment.”).
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licensed crisis pregnancy centers29 notify women that California
offers free and low-cost abortion services.30 The other required
unlicensed centers31 to post the following message: “This facility
is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of California and
has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly
supervises the provision of services.”32 Justice Stephen Breyer,
joined by fellow liberal-leaning Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, dissented and declared both
provisions “likely constitutional.”33
In Janus, the same five-Justice majority that aligned in
Becerra declared unconstitutional an Illinois statute34 compelling
public employees who are not union members to pay an agency
fee to the union that exclusively bargains on their behalf.35
Penning the majority opinion in Janus, Justice Samuel Alito
wrote that “this arrangement violates the free speech rights of
nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize private speech on
matters of substantial public concern.”36 In reaching this
conclusion—and of particular importance to this Article—Alito
opined that “measures compelling speech are at least as
threatening”37 as those squelching speech and, in fact, may cause
“additional damage.”38 Writing for the same bloc of dissenters as
29. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123471(a) (West 2016) (setting forth
the criteria for a licensed center).
30. Id. § 123472(a)(1).
31. See id. § 123471(b) (setting forth the criteria for an unlicensed center).
32. Id. § 123472(b)(1).
33. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2379–80 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that
because “most human behavior takes place through speech” and because much
of the law regulates that speech in terms of its content, the majority’s approach
“at least threatens considerable litigation over the constitutional validity of
much, perhaps most, government regulation”).
34. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(e) (2018) (providing that agency fees are
chargeable to non-union members for union activities including “the costs of the
collective bargaining process, contract administration and pursuing matters
affecting wages, hours and conditions of employment”).
35. Janus v. Am. Fed’n State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2460 (2018).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2464.
38. See id. (explaining that when speech is compelled, individuals “are
coerced into betraying their convictions” and are demeaned by being forced to
endorse ideas that they find objectionable).
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in Becerra, Justice Kagan blasted the majority both for “turning
the First Amendment into a sword, and using it against
workaday economic and regulatory policy”39 and for broadly
contending “that compelling speech always works a greater
injury, and so always requires a greater justification.”40
Finally, the Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop held that the
Colorado Civil Rights Commission violated the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause41 rights of a baker because it
failed to act with “religious neutrality” in punishing him for
violating a state anti-discrimination statute.42 The baker, Jack
Phillips, was “a devout Christian” who refused to create a cake
celebrating the marriage of a same-sex couple “because of his
religious opposition to same-sex marriage.”43
Although Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the Court
dodged the First Amendment free speech issue, Justice Clarence
Thomas issued a concurrence addressing it.44 Thomas initially
concluded that making a custom wedding cake constitutes
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment.45 He then
found that being forced to produce such a cake for a same-sex
wedding under Colorado’s anti-discrimination statute amounted
to a compelled-speech obligation that would violate the First

39. Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 2494.
41. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free
Exercise Clause was incorporated nearly eighty years ago through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as a fundamental liberty to apply
to state and local government entities and officials. See Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment embraces
First Amendment liberties).
42. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S.
Ct. 1719, 1724, 1731 (2018) (concluding that “the Commission’s treatment of
Phillips’ case violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base
laws or regulations on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint”).
43. Id.
44. See id. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“While Phillips rightly
prevails on his free-exercise claim, I write separately to address his free-speech
claim.”).
45. See id. at 1743–44 (explaining that a wedding cake symbolizes the
celebration of a new marriage and, thus, communicates a message).
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Amendment’s protection of free speech unless it could survive the
strict scrutiny standard of review.46
How Becerra, Janus, and Masterpiece Cakeshop affect the
First Amendment right not to speak is the focus of this Article as
well as the decisions’ impact on the Court’s 1985 ruling in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel.47 The Court in
Zauderer considered whether the government can lawfully
“prevent potential deception of the public by requiring attorneys
to disclose in their advertising certain information regarding fee
arrangements.”48 Specifically, Ohio compelled attorneys using
contingency fee arrangements to disclose to clients that they may
need to pay litigation costs if they lose their cases.49 The Court
emphasized that Ohio compelled only “purely factual and
uncontroversial information about the terms under which [an
attorney’s] services will be available.”50
In upholding this requirement, the Court distinguished the
above-noted cases of Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo.51 In
particular, that trio of decisions did not involve commercial
speech, which is protected by the First Amendment primarily
because of its “value to consumers.”52 The Court in Zauderer thus
held “that an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long
as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s
interest in preventing deception of consumers.”53 The Court
added that while such disclosure requirements cannot be “unduly
burdensome,”54 they need not be the least restrictive means of
46. See id. at 1745–46 (“Because Phillips’ conduct . . . was expressive,
Colorado’s public-accommodations law cannot penalize [the conduct] unless the
law withstands strict scrutiny.”); see also infra note 59 and accompanying text
(describing strict scrutiny).
47. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
48. Id. at 629.
49. See id. at 633 (“DR 2–101(B)(15) . . . provides that any advertisement
that mentions contingent-fee rates must ‘disclose whether percentages are
computed before or after deduction of court costs and expenses . . . .’”).
50. Id. at 651.
51. See id. (“[T]he interests at stake in this case are not of the same order
as those discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette.”).
52. See id. (discussing the consumer-focused considerations surrounding
First Amendment protection of commercial speech).
53. Id.
54. Id.
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serving the state’s interest in preventing deception.55
Additionally, the government need not worry about an
underinclusivity challenge.56
The Zauderer standard approximates a lenient, rational
basis test57 rather than a heightened level of judicial review—like
intermediate scrutiny58 or strict scrutiny59—even though the
55. See id. at 651 n.14 (“We reject appellant’s contention that we should
subject disclosure requirements to a strict ‘least restrictive means’ analysis
under which they must be struck down if there are other means by which the
State’s purposes may be served.”).
56. Here, the Court wrote:
[W]e are unpersuaded by appellant’s argument that a disclosure
requirement is subject to attack if it is “under-inclusive”—that is, if it
does not get at all facets of the problem it is designed to ameliorate.
As a general matter, governments are entitled to attack problems
piecemeal, save where their policies implicate rights so fundamental
that strict scrutiny must be applied.
Id.; see generally Clay Calvert, Underinclusivity and the First Amendment: The
Legislative Right to Nibble at Problems After Williams-Yulee, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
525 (2016) (providing a comprehensive review of the underinclusivity doctrine).
57. See Lili Levi, A “Faustian Pact”? Native Advertising and the Future of
the Press, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 647, 681 (2015) (opining that the test in Zauderer is
“akin to rational basis review”); see also Katie R. Eyer, The Canon of Rational
Basis Review, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2018) (asserting that “the
canonical account of rational basis review is a bleak one for those challenging
the constitutionality of government action: a doctrine which is extraordinarily
deferential and will virtually never result in government action being
overturned”); Brandon L. Garrett, Constitutional Reasonableness, 102 MINN. L.
REV. 61, 64 (2017) (observing that “rational basis review ostensibly asks judges
to deferentially review reasonable government decisions”); Cynthia Lee, Package
Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing Container Doctrine
Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403,
1467 (2010) (suggesting that “courts engaging in equal protection rational basis
review will invalidate social and economic legislation only if there is absolutely
no rational explanation, real or imagined, for the legislation”); Stacey L. Sobel,
The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court to Do Post-McDonald?, 21
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 495 (2012) (“The lowest level of review is the
rational basis test—a highly deferential form of scrutiny. In order for a
regulation to survive rational basis review, the challenger must prove that the
regulation does not bear a ‘rational relationship’ to a ‘legitimate governmental
purpose.’”).
58. Content-neutral regulations of speech typically are subject to
intermediate scrutiny. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736
(2017) (explaining that in order to survive intermediate scrutiny, North
Carolina’s content-neutral statute prohibiting sex offenders from accessing
social networking sites “must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest”). Under intermediate scrutiny, a statute “need not be the
least restrictive or least intrusive means of” serving the alleged government
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Zauderer Court did not use rational basis terminology.60 In brief,
while a version of intermediate scrutiny typically applies in
commercial speech cases where the government suppresses
speech,61 an even more lax standard from Zauderer applies when

interest in order to satisfy the “narrowly tailored” prong. Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
59. Strict scrutiny “applies either when a law is content based on its face or
when the purpose and justification for the law are content based.” Reed v. Town
of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015). Under this standard, laws are “justified
only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve
compelling state interests.” Id. at 2226. Narrow tailoring under strict scrutiny,
in turn, requires a statute to “be the least restrictive means” of serving the
government’s allegedly compelling interest. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464,
478 (2014). See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011)
(observing that a statute that restricts “the content of protected speech” will
pass strict scrutiny only if “it is justified by a compelling government interest
and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest”).
60. Former Yale Law School Dean Robert Post explains that
[b]ecause commercial speakers retain “minimal” First Amendment
interests, Zauderer does not employ the specific vocabulary of
“rational basis” review, which would have suggested extreme judicial
deference. It instead adopts terminology that unequivocally locates
judicial review further toward the deferential end of the spectrum
than the intermediate scrutiny authorized by Central Hudson.
Robert Post, C. Edwin Baker Lecture for Liberty, Equality, and Democracy:
Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 883 (2015).
61. The U.S. Supreme Court typically deploys a four-part test for
commercial speech that requires courts to
determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it
at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next,
[courts] ask whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, [courts] must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980);
see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (describing “the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson”); see also
Levi, supra note 57, at 681 n.172 (discussing how Central Hudson created “a
four-pronged standard of intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech”
(emphasis added)); Tamara R. Piety, Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas:
Commercial Speech and the Problem that Won’t Go Away, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
181, 182 (2007) (observing that “the commercial speech doctrine creates a
category of speech subject to intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment”
(emphasis added)).
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it compels advertisers to disclose factual and noncontroversial
information.62
With this background in mind, Part II of the Article
examines both Becerra and Janus and how they affect the Court’s
compelled-speech jurisprudence and, more specifically, the level
of scrutiny that applies to evaluate the constitutionality of
compelled-speech mandates. Part II also explores crucial points of
disagreement between the majority and dissent in Becerra over
the scope of the Court’s decades-old ruling in Zauderer. Part III
then turns in greater detail to Justice Thomas’s concurrence in
Masterpiece Cakeshop, in which he elaborated on his views
regarding compelled speech. Thomas’s Masterpiece Cakeshop
opinion merits separate analysis here because he penned the
majority opinion just three weeks later in Becerra, which struck
down a pair of compelled-speech obligations.63 Finally, Part IV
concludes by proposing criteria for the Court to use when
deciding the proper level of scrutiny in compelled-speech cases.
Regardless of whether the Court adopts these variables, it is
imperative for it to better articulate and then consistently apply
its own standards for determining scrutiny in compelled-speech
disputes. This would add predictability to this now jumbled niche
of First Amendment jurisprudence and, in the process, enhance
the Court’s legitimacy that arguably is eroded when it fractures
along perceived political lines in compelled-speech cases such as
Becerra and Janus.
II. Compelled Speech and the Chasm Dividing the Justices:
Examining Becerra and Janus and Their Impact on Zauderer
This Part of the Article has two sections. Section A explores
the Supreme Court’s analysis of a compelled-speech obligation in
National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra and how
the majority and dissent disagreed about the applicable level of
62. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
(stating that an advertiser’s “constitutionally protected interest in not providing
any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal”).
63. Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (case decided on June 4, 2018), with Nat’l Inst. of Family &
Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (case decided on June 26,
2018).
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scrutiny. Section B then assesses the Court’s discussion of
compelled speech in Janus v. American Federation of State,
County, & Municipal Employees and the similar clash over
scrutiny in Janus.
A. National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra
As noted above, Becerra concerned the constitutionality of a
California law compelling speech at both licensed and unlicensed
crisis pregnancy centers.64 For simplicity’s sake, this section
focuses on the obligation at licensed centers to inform women
that “California has public programs that provide immediate free
or low-cost access to comprehensive family planning services
(including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), prenatal
care, and abortion for eligible women.”65 This message had to be
conveyed either by being posted in a conspicuous place in a
facility’s waiting room or by being given individually in print or
digital form to all clients.66
California enacted this measure—called the FACT Act—to
educate women about “their rights and the health care services
available to them.”67 The compelled-speech obligation was
essential because, according to the state, “thousands of women”
are unaware of public programs relating to abortion services.68
Additionally, the state contended that delivery of the message
about abortion services at crisis facilities was critical because of
the “time sensitive nature of pregnancy-related decisions.”69
In short, California’s rationale taps into what Professor Burt
Neuborne calls “a hearer’s First Amendment right to know”70
about “information and ideas that will assist the hearer in
64. See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text (providing an overview of
the laws at issue in Becerra, as well as the Court’s decision in the case).
65. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123472 (a)(1) (West 2016).
66. See id. § 123472 (a)(2)(A)–(C) (listing the three ways through which the
information may be distributed).
67. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2369.
68. See id. (describing the state legislature’s motivation in enacting the
measure).
69. Id.
70. Burt Neuborne, The Status of the Hearer in Mr. Madison’s
Neighborhood, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 897, 906 (2017).
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making rational, informed choices, whether economic, social,
aesthetic, or political.”71 Although the Supreme Court has
acknowledged in dicta the existence of a First Amendment right
to receive speech,72 Neuborne notes that the Court generally “has
not . . . developed the right to know beyond the slogan stage.”73
Before delving into Becerra’s majority and dissenting
opinions, it is useful to pinpoint precisely what California’s law
did and did not do. Specifically, the compelled-speech mandate for
licensed
centers
might
be
considered
a
pure
74
disclosure-of-factual-information obligation. Unlike the seminal
right-not-to-speak cases of Barnette and Wooley, California did
not compel the centers to express a viewpoint, adopt a position, or
convey a state-sponsored philosophy, maxim, or creed.75
Additionally, and in contrast with Tornillo, in which Florida
required newspapers in the Sunshine State to print the views of
political candidates who those newspapers criticized or
attacked,76 licensed centers were not forced to publish noxious
political views or positions.77 California’s law thus was not what
might
be
characterized
as
an
expression-of-viewpoint
compelled-speech obligation.78
71. Id. at 906–07.
72. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (asserting that
the “freedom of speech and press includes,” among other things, “the right to
receive” speech); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 475 U.S.
1, 8 (1986) (“By protecting those who wish to enter the marketplace of ideas
from government attack, the First Amendment protects the public’s interest in
receiving information.”).
73. Neuborne, supra note 70, at 907.
74. See supra notes 47–56 and accompanying text (distinguishing
Zauderer’s commercial speech conveying factual information from other forms of
compelled speech).
75. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2368–70 (2018) (describing the law’s factual, information-based disclosure
requirements).
76. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243 (1974) (“The
issue in this case is whether a state statute granting a political candidate a
right to equal space to reply to criticism and attacks on his record by a
newspaper violates the guarantees of a free press.”).
77. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (characterizing the notice’s content as
“the availability of state-sponsored services, as well as contact information for
how to obtain them”).
78. Compare id., with Janus v. Am. Fed’n State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138
S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018) (explaining that mandatory labor union fees are
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Additionally, California’s law targeting licensed centers was
not what might be dubbed a prevention-of-deception
compelled-speech obligation.79 It was not, in other words,
designed to correct information conveyed at licensed centers that
might be false or misleading. Rather, as California lawmakers
put it, the measure was intended to “ensure that California
residents make their personal reproductive health care
decisions knowing their rights and the health care services
available to them.”80 The obligation thus might—positively
put—be called a knowledge-enhancement compelled-speech
mandate or—negatively parsed—a correction-of-ignorance duty.81
One might query whether a state has a greater interest in
compelling speech to prevent deception or to enhance knowledge
or, alternatively, whether compelling speech in the name of those
two interests is of equal importance when evaluating the
constitutionality of a compelled-speech statute.
Furthermore, California’s law might also be classified as a
message-diluting or message-adulterating compelled-speech
obligation.82 That is because, by being forced to convey facts about
a procedure to which the speaker (i.e., a licensed crisis pregnancy
center) objects and, in turn, to convey facts that might (because
they specify that abortion services are offered free and at
low-cost) lead a patient to adopt that procedure, the power of the
speaker’s own message in favor of not terminating pregnancy is
arguably diminished.83 Put differently, a licensed crisis
pregnancy center with an anti-abortion stance might find that its
message’s influence is mitigated (or at least contaminated) by
viewpoint-based compelled speech).
79. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985) (recognizing the state’s legitimate interest in “preventing deception of
consumers”).
80. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2369.
81. See Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 611
(1935) (“The state may . . . afford protection against ignorance, incapacity, and
imposition.”); see also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982) (recognizing the
state’s interest in controlling advertising for professional services due to “the
public’s comparative lack of knowledge”).
82. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (discussing the effect of content-based
speech regulations that undermine the speaker’s message).
83. See id. (describing that a mandatory notice promoting state-subsidized
abortions “alters the content” of the clinic’s anti-abortion speech).
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transmitting a fact suggesting that one’s financial status imposes
no barrier to obtaining an abortion.84
This Article returns in the Conclusion to some of the
italicized labels used immediately above for characterizing
compelled-speech laws. Specifically, the labels are melded into
the criteria the Conclusion proposes for courts to use when
deciding the proper level of scrutiny in compelled-speech cases.85
Indeed, a vital issue—and a point of dispute between the majority
and dissent—in Becerra was the standard of scrutiny the Court
should apply to the compelled-speech obligation imposed on
licensed crisis pregnancy centers.86
In an opinion written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the
majority
concluded
that
because
the
measure
was
87
88
content-based, strict scrutiny should apply unless the case
either fit within the confines of Zauderer89 or involved the
regulation “of professional conduct that incidentally burden[ed]
speech.”90 The majority not only determined that neither
exception applied,91 but also found that the law could not pass
muster even under intermediate scrutiny because it was not
narrowly tailored to serve what the majority assumed was a
substantial interest in “providing low-income women with
information about state-sponsored services.”92

84. See id. (acknowledging the conflict between providing information for
abortion services while simultaneously trying to “dissuade women from choosing
that option”).
85. See discussion infra Part IV (taking a holistic approach and
articulating multiple variables for considering the proper level of scrutiny in
compelled-speech cases).
86. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2382–83 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s decision
to apply a heightened standard of scrutiny).
87. See id. at 2365 (majority opinion) (reasoning that the notices were
content-based regulations because they compelled petitioners to speak a
particular message, thus “alter[ing] the content of their speech”).
88. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (describing strict scrutiny).
89. See supra notes 47–62 and accompanying text (describing Zauderer and
the test the Court fashioned in it).
90. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373.
91. See id. at 2372–73 (describing each exception and concluding that
neither applied).
92. Id.
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In rejecting application of the Zauderer test, the majority
limited that test to situations in which the compelled speech
relates to services provided by the regulated entity or
individual.93 Because crisis pregnancy centers do not offer
abortions, Zauderer did not apply.94
Moreover, the majority reasoned that Zauderer only concerns
situations involving compelled speech about uncontroversial
topics.95 Thomas opined that abortion is “anything but an
‘uncontroversial’ topic.”96 This, however, cleverly contorts
Zauderer’s actual language. Zauderer mentioned “uncontroversial
information,”97 not an uncontroversial topic. Additionally, and
problematically, what constitutes a “controversial” topic is
subjective, and Thomas offered no guidance for how it might be
established.98
The majority also rejected the argument that California’s law
primarily regulated professional conduct and only incidentally
burdened speech.99 Becerra was not, Justice Thomas reasoned, an
informed-consent case in which the government mandated speech
incidental to a procedure performed by a professional.100 In other
words, because licensed crisis pregnancy centers do not
themselves perform abortions, the speech California required was
93. See id. at 2372 (“The notice in no way relates to the services that
licensed clinics provide. Instead, it requires these clinics to disclose information
about state-sponsored services—including abortion . . . .”).
94. See id. (acknowledging that abortion is one such service that the
licensed clinics do not provide and clarifying that Zauderer applies only in the
context of professionals advertising their own services).
95. See id. (explaining that the disclosures in Zauderer were upheld
because they contained “purely factual and uncontroversial information”).
96. Id.
97. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
(emphasis added).
98. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372
(2018) (opining that abortion is “anything but” an uncontroversial topic without
justifying his assertion).
99. See id. at 2373–74 (concluding that the licensed notice does not regulate
professional conduct because it applies to “all interactions between a covered
facility and its clients, regardless of whether a medical procedure is ever sought,
offered, or performed”).
100. See id. (suggesting that Becerra falls short of the line “long familiar to
the bar” between conduct and speech—only the former of which can be heavily
regulated).
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untethered from any conduct.101 Thomas therefore concluded that
instead of being incidental to conduct, the “licensed notice
regulates speech as speech” and requires heightened scrutiny.102
The majority in Becerra, however, suggested two other
circumstances when compelled-speech requirements are
permissible, including when the message: 1) consists “of health
and safety warnings long considered permissible,”103 or 2)
involves “purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures about
commercial products.”104 Regarding the former circumstance, the
majority failed to clarify for precisely how long a health and
safety warning must have both existed and been considered
permissible before it falls within this exception.105 Additionally,
Thomas did not articulate when a warning implicates “health and
safety” concerns.106 As for the latter exception, it seemingly
extends Zauderer from the realm of services offered by attorneys
and doctors to the domain of products sold commercially.107
In summary, the Becerra majority held that content-based,
compelled-speech regulations must surmount heightened scrutiny
unless one of four exceptions applies.108 Those exceptions arise
when the compelled speech:
101. See id. at 2373 (“The notice does not facilitate informed consent to a
medical procedure. In fact, it is not tied to a procedure at all.”).
102. See id. at 2372–74 (stating that “neither line of precedents” applying to
“purely factual and uncontroversial information” or to notices that
“regulat[e] . . . professional conduct” would lessen the standard of scrutiny in
this case).
103. Id. at 2376.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The majority . . . does not
explain why the [FACT] Act here, which is justified in part by health and safety
considerations, does not fall within its ‘health’ category.”).
106. See id. at 2376 (majority opinion) (stating the legality of “health and
safety warnings” without defining a standard to determine whether a disclosure
falls into that category).
107. Compare Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 561–62, 655 (upholding the State of
Ohio’s requirement that an attorney offering services on a contingent fee basis
disclose that clients would have to pay costs even in an unsuccessful lawsuit),
with Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2376 (indicating that “purely factual and
uncontroversial disclosures about commercial products” fall under the Zauderer
exception for compelled speech (emphasis added)).
108. See cases cited infra notes 109–112 and accompanying text
(summarizing the exceptions to the heightened scrutiny standard for compelled
speech designated by the Becerra majority).
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1) is purely factual, pertains to services rendered directly by
the regulated entity or individual, and relates to an
uncontroversial topic;109 or
2) is merely incidental to conduct (a procedure) performed by a
professional;110 or
3) consists of warnings affecting health and safety, and those
warnings have been considered permissible for a long period of
time;111 or
4) relates to commercial products and conveys factual and
uncontroversial information about them. 112

Of particular importance from a free-speech theory
perspective, the majority invoked the venerable marketplace of
ideas metaphor113 to illustrate the supposed danger of California
imposing its compelled-speech obligation on licensed facilities and
show why strict scrutiny must apply.114 The marketplace theory,
in a nutshell, comports with “the idea that freedom of speech
serves as an effective mechanism for locating truth, for
identifying and expunging falsity, and for increasing the stock of
human knowledge.”115 It was instantiated in First Amendment
109. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2372 (2018) (explaining the Becerra majority’s interpretation of when Zauderer
applies); see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (indicating that the constitutional
protections for a right not to provide uncontroversial factual information are
minimal).
110. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2373 (discussing the “professional conduct”
exception).
111. See id. at 2376 (“[W]e do not question the legality of health and safety
warnings long considered permissible . . . .”).
112. See id. (addressing “uncontroversial disclosures about commercial
products”).
113. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992) (“The
‘marketplace of ideas’ is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech
tradition.”); see also Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying
Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 998 (2003) (indicating
the marketplace theory pivots on the belief that free speech “contributes to the
promotion of truth”).
114. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374–75 (citing the marketplace theory)
(“[W]hen the government polices the content of professional speech, it can fail ‘to
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail.’” (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 476 (2014))).
115. Frederick Schauer, Free Speech, the Search for Truth, and the Problem
of Collective Knowledge, 70 SMU L. REV. 231, 235 (2017).
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jurisprudence a century ago by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. when he asserted in Abrams v. United States116 that
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is
the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out.117

In its most simplistic—and perhaps naïve118—formulation,
the metaphor invokes “the perfect competition of an idealized
neoclassical free market. Bad ideas should be no more feared
than bad products or services; they will simply lose out to better
competitors, so long as all are freely available.”119 If this is the
case, then an interesting question arises for the metaphor’s
deployment in Becerra: If California’s mandate that licensed
centers provide true facts to women about the availability of free
and low-cost abortions actually expands the speech marketplace
and helps pregnant women better know their options,120 then how
did the majority turn the metaphor against the state?
The answer, it appears, is this: Government intervention in
the marketplace of ideas compelling professionals to convey facts
about a procedure they disagree with is simply wrong. That is
116. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
117. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Thomas W. Joo, The Worst
Test of Truth: The “Marketplace of Ideas” as Faulty Metaphor, 89 TUL. L. REV.
383, 385 (2014) (“The metaphor can be traced to Justice Holmes’s dissent in the
1919 case, Abrams v. United States.”).
118. See Lyrissa Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First
Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 826 (2010) (“According to critics, the
marketplace of ideas cannot function because a few powerful voices drown out
all others. The resulting lack of diversity in public discourse deprives citizen
[sic] of the information they need to make rational decisions and denies them
their right to participate in policy formation.”); see also Smolla, supra note 113,
at 6 (“The marketplace of ideas, no less than the marketplace of commerce, will
inevitably be biased in favor of those with the resources to ply their wares.”).
119. Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J.
821, 829–30 (2008).
120. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2375 (2018) (stating that California’s interest in requiring the licensed notice
was “providing low-income women with information about state-sponsored
services”).
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because those facts simultaneously dilute the power of the
professional’s own speech while increasing the odds that patients
will adopt the disagreed-with procedure that the government
(literally, through funding) sponsors.121 That, at least, is one way
to unpack the statement by Justice Thomas in Becerra that
when the government polices the content of professional
speech, it can fail to “preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.” Professionals
might have a host of good-faith disagreements, both with each
other and with the government, on many topics in their
respective fields . . . . “[T]he best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market,” and the people lose when the government is the one
deciding which ideas should prevail.122

A seeming weakness with this logic is that California was not
“deciding” for either professionals or patients at licensed centers
whether abortion was a good idea or, to borrow Thomas’s term,
an idea that “should prevail.”123 Furthermore, California did not
require any viewpoint on the idea of abortion to be conveyed.
Instead, it simply compelled transmission of indisputably true
facts about abortion services.124 Objectively true facts—unlike the
subjective idea of whether abortion is a good or bad (morally or
medically) procedure—are not subject for debate in the
marketplace of ideas.125 The facts simply add truthful information
to the speech marketplace.
Indeed, as Justice Stephen Breyer wrote for the four-Justice
dissent in Becerra, the “marketplace is fostered, not hindered, by
providing information to patients to enable them to make fully
121. See id. at 2371 (“By requiring petitioners to inform women how they
can obtain state-subsidized abortions—at the same time petitioners try to
dissuade women from choosing that option—the licensed notice plainly ‘alters
the content’ of petitioners’ speech.”).
122. Id. at 2374–75 (internal citations omitted).
123. See id. (“[T]he people lose when the government is the one deciding who
should prevail.”).
124. See id. at 2379–80 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 123472(a)(1) (West 2018) (showing that California’s required
disclosure did not require professionals to express a viewpoint regarding
abortion)).
125. See id. at 2388 (expressing Breyer’s view that the marketplace of ideas
is “fostered, not hindered by providing [factual] information to patients to enable
them to make fully informed decisions in respect to their pregnancies”).
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informed medical decisions in respect to their pregnancies.”126
Pointing out the key distinction between disputable ideas and
incontestable facts, Breyer added that while “[a]bortion is a
controversial topic and a source of normative debate,”127 the
accessibility “of state resources is not a normative statement or a
fact of debatable truth.”128
Justice Thomas’s invocation of the marketplace metaphor to
support the conclusion that strict scrutiny generally applies when
the government compels professionals to convey content-based
messages might have been bolstered if he had argued that there
are at least two distinct idea marketplaces: One is a
mini-marketplace of ideas (the one inside the walls of a licensed
crisis pregnancy center) and the other is a macro-marketplace of
ideas (the public places and spaces outside the walls of a center).
Indeed, the majority had no problem with California conveying
facts about low-cost and free abortion services in the latter
marketplace.129 As Thomas wrote, California was free to “post the
information on public property near crisis pregnancy centers.”130
In other words, the government can meddle and intervene all it
wants in one marketplace of ideas, but just not in another. The
majority, however, failed to explicitly articulate such a
bifurcated-marketplace argument.131
Turning to the Becerra dissent, which concluded the
obligation
imposed
on
licensed
centers
was
“likely
constitutional,”132 Justice Breyer initially criticized the majority’s
overarching logic that because California’s law was
content-based, then strict scrutiny presumptively applied in the
absence of the four exceptions described earlier.133 Breyer opined
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 2376 (majority opinion) (suggesting that California could
have conveyed information about public funding for abortion services via a
“public-information campaign”).
130. Id.
131. See id. at 2374–76 (discussing the importance of maintaining a free and
uninhibited marketplace of ideas but failing to distinguish between the public
marketplace and the marketplace inside a licensed pregnancy center).
132. Id. at 2379 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
133. See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text (describing the four
exceptions).
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that this methodology—what he dubbed a “general broad
‘content-based’ test”134—for determining scrutiny
threatens to create serious problems. Because much, perhaps
most, human behavior takes place through speech and because
much, perhaps most, law regulates that speech in terms of its
content, the majority’s approach at the least threatens
considerable litigation over the constitutional validity of much,
perhaps most, government regulation. Virtually every
disclosure law could be considered “content based,” for
virtually every disclosure law requires individuals “to speak a
particular message.”135

This analysis partly reflects Breyer’s long-standing rejection
of both a rigid, categorical approach to levels of scrutiny136 and a
First Amendment “jurisprudence of labels.”137 Furthermore, it
suggests his fondness for a more fluid balancing and
proportionality tack.138 It also is indicative of Breyer’s belief that
conduct—or “human behavior,”139 as he put it in Becerra—and
speech are often so intertwined that distinguishing between them
when it comes to determining scrutiny is injudicious.140 But
134. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2381
(2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
135. See id. at 2380 (quoting Justice Thomas’s majority opinion).
136. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer,
J., concurring)
The First Amendment requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the
Amendment’s expressive objectives and to the public’s legitimate
need for regulation than a simple recitation of categories, such as
“content discrimination” and “strict scrutiny,” would permit. In my
view, the category “content discrimination” is better considered in
many contexts, including here, as a rule of thumb, rather than as an
automatic “strict scrutiny” trigger, leading to almost certain legal
condemnation.
137. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 484 (2009) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (advocating for a purpose-based approach to the categorization of
speech, rather than rigid adherence to forum-based labels).
138. See Donald L. Beschle, No More Tiers? Proportionality as an Alternative
to Multiple Levels of Scrutiny in Individual Rights Cases, 38 PACE L. REV. 384,
419 (2018) (observing that Breyer “has shown some enthusiasm for
proportionality analysis in his separate opinions”); see also Jamal Greene, The
Supreme Court 2017 Term: Foreword—Rights as Trumps? 132 HARV. L. REV. 28,
55 (2018) (“Proportionality and balancing approaches to rights have long found
favor with Justice Breyer.”).
139. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140. For example, Justice Breyer wrote in 2017 that “virtually all
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Becerra, unlike Reed v. Town of Gilbert,141 Expressions Hair
Design v. Schneiderman142 and Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,143 gave
Breyer his first opportunity to put those beliefs into practice in a
compelled-speech context.
Thus, Breyer unsurprisingly sounded an alarm in Becerra: If
the majority’s position takes hold—that in the absence of an
exception,
strict
scrutiny
applies
to
content-based,
compelled-speech mandates—it “could radically change prior law,
perhaps placing much securities law or consumer protection law
at constitutional risk, depending on how broadly its exceptions
are interpreted.”144 He fretted that the majority’s tack to
determining scrutiny might open the metaphorical floodgates of
litigation145 by providing a battering ram (i.e., strict scrutiny) to
attack “ordinary social and economic regulation”146 and “the mine
run of disclosure requirements.”147

government regulation affects speech. Human relations take place through
speech.” Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017)
(Breyer, J., concurring). He thus contended that “it is often wiser not to try to
distinguish between ‘speech’ and ‘conduct.’” Id.
141. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (providing Breyer’s relevant
sentiment in Reed).
142. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (providing Breyer’s relevant
sentiment in Schneiderman).
143. 564 U.S. 552 (2011). Foreshadowing his dissent in Becerra, Justice
Breyer in Sorrell criticized the notion that strict scrutiny reflexively applies
when a statute is content-based, opining that:
To apply a strict First Amendment standard virtually as a matter of
course when a court reviews ordinary economic regulatory programs
(even if that program has a modest impact upon a firm’s ability to
shape a commercial message) would work at cross-purposes with this
more basic constitutional approach. Since ordinary regulatory
programs can affect speech, particularly commercial speech, in
myriad ways, to apply a “heightened” First Amendment standard of
review whenever such a program burdens speech would transfer from
legislatures to judges the primary power to weigh ends and to choose
means, threatening to distort or undermine legitimate legislative
objectives.
Id. at 584–85 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
144. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
145. See id. at 2381 (asserting that the majority’s content-based test issues
an “invitation to litigation”).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Breyer suggested that the majority’s decision to constrict the
deferential Zauderer rule—an exception to strict scrutiny—only
to cases where “disclosures related to the professional’s own
services or conduct”148 was misguided because “[m]any ordinary
disclosure laws”149 do not fit this scenario and thus would
confront strict scrutiny review. As an example, he cited a
California statute “requiring hospitals to tell parents about child
seat belts.”150
Additionally, Breyer blasted Thomas’s cursorily tossed-out
effort in Becerra to articulate two other exceptions, each noted
earlier, to the general rule that strict scrutiny applies in
content-based, compelled-speech cases.151 Thomas offered those
exceptions when he explained that “we do not question the
legality of health and safety warnings long considered
permissible, or purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures
about commercial products.”152
Breyer derisively dubbed this a “generally phrased
disclaimer.”153 Beyond the difficulties with it addressed earlier,
Breyer contended Thomas’s attempt to carve out two more
exceptions from heightened review was “more likely to invite
litigation than to provide needed limitation and clarification. The
majority, for example, does not explain why the Act here, which is
justified in part by health and safety considerations, does not fall
148. Id. at 2380. Justice Thomas explained for the Becerra majority that
Zauderer was inapplicable because “[t]he notice in no way relates to the services
that licensed clinics provide. Instead, it requires these clinics to disclose
information about state-sponsored services—including abortion, anything but an
‘uncontroversial’ topic. Accordingly, Zauderer has no application here.” See id. at
2372 (majority opinion) (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626, 651 (1985)); see supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (describing
how the Becerra majority rejected Zauderer’s application to the facts in Becerra).
149. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380
(2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
150. See id. (citing CAL. VEH. CODE § 27363.5 (a) (West 2013) (requiring
hospitals and birthing centers to “provide to and discuss with the parents or the
person to whom the child is released, if the child is under eight years of age,
information on the current law requiring child passenger restraint systems,
safety belts, and the transportation of children in rear seats”)).
151. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text (identifying these
exceptions articulated by Justice Thomas).
152. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2376 (majority opinion).
153. Id. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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within its ‘health’ category.”154 He also attacked the “absence of a
reasoned explanation of the disclaimer’s meaning and
rationale.”155
So, if the Becerra majority’s approach to fathoming the
correct level of scrutiny in a compelled-speech case was wrong,
then what did Breyer and the dissent suggest was a better
methodology? Rather than presume that strict scrutiny applies
solely because a law is content-based, Breyer reasoned that the
Court should deferentially adopt a “respectful approach to
economic and social legislation when a First Amendment claim
like the claim present here is at issue.”156
More specifically, in the context of compelled-disclosure cases
involving health issues, Breyer suggested the default standard of
scrutiny should be akin to rational basis review157 and focus on
the reasonableness of legislative action.158 He cited Zauderer to
support this proposition.159 Breyer pointed out that the Court
there “refused to apply heightened scrutiny.”160 He also argued
that Zauderer was “not so limited,”161 as the Becerra majority
claimed, to only cases involving services provided directly by the
speaker.162
This marks a critical difference from the Becerra majority’s
approach to scrutiny, because “[w]hile presumptive validity
attaches to rational-basis review, a presumption of
unconstitutionality
attends
any
form
of
heightened

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2382.
157. See supra note 57 (providing an overview of rational basis review).
158. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2381–82 (outlining the Court’s historically
deferential approach to evaluating social regulation that relied on the
reasonableness of the legislative action to determine whether any speech
compelled by the regulation violated the Constitution).
159. See id. at 2382 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471
U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
160. Id. at 2386–87.
161. Id. at 2387.
162. See id. (pointing out that the rationale behind protecting commercial
speech in the first place—namely, to help provide consumers with
information—was “not in any way tied to advertisements about a professional’s
own services”).
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scrutiny—either strict or intermediate.”163 In brief, the majority’s
application of heightened scrutiny causes a content-based,
compelled-speech law to become presumptively unconstitutional
unless one of four exceptions applies.164 Conversely, under the
dissent’s tack, a content-based, compelled-speech law involving
the disclosure of purely factual information is presumptively
constitutional.
The dissent’s position comports with the notion that the
rational basis test is “typically applied to review of economic and
social regulations,”165 at least when “there is no discrimination
based on a suspect classification or infringement of a
fundamental right.”166 The First Amendment protection of speech
is a fundamental right,167 however, so rational basis review
typically “plays an extremely limited role in free speech cases.”168
In addition to playing a role in Zauderer, rational basis review
also applies to free-speech jurisprudence affecting public school
students.169
163. Kenneth A. Klukowski, Making Second Amendment Law with First
Amendment Rules: The Five-Tier Free Speech Framework and Public Forum
Doctrine in Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 93 NEB. L. REV. 429, 463 (2014)
(internal citations omitted).
164. See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text (setting forth the
majority’s four exceptions to the rule that heightened scrutiny presumptively
applies).
165. Nicholas Walter, The Utility of Rational Basis Review, 63 VILL. L. REV.
79, 79 (2018).
166. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test Is Constitutional (and
Desirable), 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 403 (2016).
167. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (“Freedom of speech and
freedom of the press, which are protected by the First Amendment from
infringement by Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights and
liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by
state action.”).
168. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate
Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 787
(2007).
169. The Court has concluded that “educators do not offend the First
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). As Dean Erwin Chemerinsky notes, this
“is the classic phrasing of the rational basis review.” Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Hazelwooding of the First Amendment: The Deference to Authority, 11 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 291, 294 (2013).
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Breyer and the dissent contended that Zauderer’s deferential
test—rather than heightened scrutiny—applies broadly to cases
that compel only the disclosure of purely factual,
noncontroversial information and that do not force a speaker to
convey or adopt a state-sponsored position or opinion on politics,
religion, or the nation.170 In the dissent’s view, this standard is
appropriate because the entire rationale for protecting the speech
of professionals in commercial settings is to help consumers
better understand things and make informed choices.171 Put
differently, the audience’s interest in receiving facts is maximal
while the speaker’s interest in not conveying them is minimal.172
In summary, the Becerra majority and dissent took radically
different approaches for determining the applicable level of
scrutiny in compelled-disclosure cases and, in doing so, reached
drastically different results. The majority’s formulaic tack started
by considering whether the law was content-based or
content-neutral.173 After deeming it content-based,174 the majority
then concluded heightened scrutiny should apply unless the case
fit within one of four exceptions.175 Because it did not fall within
170. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2387 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[W]here a State’s requirement to speak
‘purely factual and uncontroversial information’ does not attempt to ‘prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein,’ it does not
warrant heightened scrutiny.” (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985))).
171. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (observing that “the extension of First
Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value
to consumers of the information such speech provides”).
172. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
Whether the context is advertising the professional’s own services or
other commercial speech, a doctor’s First Amendment interest in not
providing factual information to patients is the same: minimal,
because his professional speech is protected precisely because of its
informational value to patients. There is no reason to subject such
laws to heightened scrutiny.
173. See id. at 2371 (majority opinion) (discussing how content-based
regulations, unlike neutral regulations, target speech based on “communicative
content”).
174. See id. (“The licensed notice is a content-based regulation of speech.”).
175. See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text (setting forth the
majority’s four exceptions to the rule that heightened scrutiny presumptively
applies).
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those exceptions (including the majority’s constricted view of
Zauderer), strict scrutiny presumptively applied to the
compelled-disclosure mandate at licensed centers.176 Adding
insult to injury, the majority held that the mandate could not
pass muster even under intermediate scrutiny, a lesser standard
of heightened review.177
The dissent rejected this approach.178 Its test for determining
if heightened scrutiny applies does not pivot on whether a
compelled-speech obligation is content-based.179 Instead, it
assumes the obligation is content-based.180 The dissent then asks
whether the compelled message involves “purely factual and
uncontroversial
information”181 or,
instead,
whether
it
“prescribe[s] what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force[s] citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein.”182
If the compelled message consists only of the former speech,
then “it does not warrant heightened scrutiny.”183 The
government only needs to prove that the message, per Zauderer,
is “reasonably related to the State’s interest.”184 If it involves the
latter, then presumably heightened scrutiny applies.185 The
176. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371 (referring to strict scrutiny as a
“stringent standard”).
177. See id. at 2375 (explaining that California’s licensed notice cannot even
survive intermediate scrutiny because the notice is “not sufficiently drawn to
achieve” the state’s asserted interest of providing low-income women with
information about state-sponsored services).
178. See id. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (warning that the majority’s
focus on whether or not speech is content-based “threatens to cause serious
problems” as it “threatens considerable litigation over the constitutional validity
of much, perhaps most, government regulation”).
179. See id. at 2381 (expressing the view that “[p]recedent does not require a
test such as the majority’s”).
180. See id. at 2380 (noting that “[v]irtually every disclosure law could be
considered ‘content-based’”).
181. See id. at 2387 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182. See id. (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943)).
183. Id.
184. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)
(holding that an advertiser’s rights are protected “as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the [s]tate’s interest in preventing
deception of consumers”).
185. Id.
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dissent concluded that the compelled-speech mandate for licensed
crisis pregnancy centers about the costs of abortion services fell
into the former category because “the availability of state
resources is not a normative statement or a fact of debatable
truth.”186 The dissent, in turn, considered the speech to be “likely
constitutional.”187
With these profoundly divergent approaches to scrutiny in a
compelled-speech case—specifically, a compelled-disclosure-offacts case—in mind, the Article next turns to another 2018
Supreme Court decision involving compelled expression, but in a
very different context. While the circumstances in the next case,
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal
Employees, Council 31, are distinct from Becerra, the split over
scrutiny and the alignment of the Justices is remarkably
consistent.
B. Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal
Employees, Council 31
As far as compelled-speech cases go, Janus differs from
Becerra in at least three key ways: First, Janus is a two-step
compelled-speech case because the law at issue only compelled a
monetary contribution, not a direct message.188 The monetary
contribution, in turn, would be used to support the speech of the
labor union to which it was made.189 Put differently, Janus is a
compelled-subsidy-of-speech case.
Second, Janus did not involve a government-drafted message
that had to be conveyed, as was the case in Becerra.190 The law, in
186. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2388
(2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 2379.
188. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S.
Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018) (noting that under the Illinois statute in question, a
non-union member who is a public employee must “pay what is generally called
an ‘agency fee,’ which amounts to a percentage of the union dues”).
189. See id. (explaining that the money would “subsidize private speech on
matters of substantial public concern”).
190. See Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2377 (describing California’s unlicensed
notice
as
imposing
“government-scripted,
speaker-based
disclosure
requirement[s] wholly disconnected from California’s informational interest”).
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other words, did not require labor unions to follow a script
penned and approved by Illinois lawmakers.191 In brief, labor
unions did not need to hew to a specific text in using the
money—they only had to use the money to support collective
bargaining activities on behalf of the people who were compelled
to pay it.192
A third distinction from Becerra is that Janus was not a
compelled-disclosure case.193 Janus was not about enhancing
citizens’ knowledge of their rights to access a state-sponsored
program, as was the interest that animated California lawmakers
in Becerra.194 Rather, Janus involved bolstering a union’s ability
to speak on behalf of its own members and the non-union
employees it was required to represent during bargaining.195
Should these differences affect the level of scrutiny to which
the compelled-speech laws at issue in Becerra and Janus were
subjected? That normative question is now especially important
because,
ultimately,
the
conservative
majority
in
Janus—precisely as it had done in Becerra—put the law under
the scalpel of heightened scrutiny.196 And, as was the case in
191. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2461 (describing how the statute merely
directed the union to “provide nonmembers with ‘an adequate explanation of the
basis for the [agency] fee’”).
192. Per the Illinois statute at issue in Janus, agency fees were chargeable
to non-union members for union activities including “the costs of the collective
bargaining process, contract administration and pursuing matters affecting
wages, hours and conditions of employment.” 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6 (e) (2018).
193. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463–64 (explaining how compelled disclosure
“forc[es] free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find
objectionable”).
194. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text (addressing the
legislative intent behind California’s compelled-speech mandate at licensed
crisis pregnancy centers).
195. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460 (detailing how unions become employees’
designated representative, regardless of whether or not the employees choose to
become members).
196. Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority in Janus, noted that the
dissent “proposes that we apply what amounts to rational-basis review.” Janus,
138 S. Ct. at 2465. Alito bluntly rebuffed that tack, reasoning that “[t]his form of
minimal scrutiny is foreign to our free-speech jurisprudence, and we reject it
here.” Id. The majority instead applied the heightened standard of review
known as exacting scrutiny, which it called “a less demanding test” than strict
scrutiny. Id. In justifying the application of a heightened standard of review,
Alito explained that “because the compelled subsidization of private speech
seriously impinges on First Amendment rights, it cannot be casually allowed.”
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Becerra, the four-Justice, liberal-bloc dissent adopted a relaxed,
deferential level of review in Janus.197 In a nutshell, two very
different compelled-speech cases were treated in a similarly
fractured fashion.198
Why did the majority in Janus apply heightened scrutiny?
Its discussion of compelled speech sheds much light on that
question. Furthermore, coming just one day after the split
decision was handed down in Becerra,199 the Janus decision
illustrates why compelled speech is a doctrine in disarray.
Before delving into the majority’s analysis, however, a brief
review of the facts is essential. Mark Janus, an Illinois public
employee who was not a union member, objected to being forced
by state law to pay an agency fee to support the collective
bargaining activities of the union designated to exclusively
represent him, the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees, Council 31 (“AFSCME”).200 Under Illinois
Id. at 2464. See generally R. George Wright, A Hard Look at Exacting Scrutiny,
85 UMKC L. REV. 207 (2016) (providing an overview and critique of the exacting
scrutiny test).
197. Writing for the Janus dissenters, Justice Elena Kagan explained that
when the government, acting as an employer, regulates an employee’s
expression related to “the terms and conditions of employment,” the Court
should treat the government’s decisions with “respect—even solicitude.” Janus,
138 S. Ct. at 2493 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Under this approach, “the government
really cannot lose” because “managerial interests are obvious and strong. And so
government employees are . . . just employees, even though they work for the
government.” Id. The Court thus should have applied what Kagan called its
“usual deferential approach” akin to the test articulated in Pickering v. Board of
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Id. As Kagan interpreted that test, if the
regulated “speech is about and directed to the workplace—as contrasted with
the broader public square,” such as “speech about the terms and conditions of
employment—the essential stuff of collective bargaining,” then the government
wins. Id. at 2495. More bluntly, she added that “[i]f an employee’s speech is
about, in, and directed to the workplace, she has no ‘possibility of a First
Amendment claim.’” See id. at 2496 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,
418 (2006)).
198. Justice Thomas wrote for the Becerra majority joined by Justices
Kennedy, Roberts, and Alito with Justice Gorsuch concurring. The dissenting
opinion was written by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsberg, Sotomayor,
and Kagan. Likewise, Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Janus majority,
joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Roberts, and Gorsuch.
199. Becerra was decided on June 26, 2018, while Janus was decided on
June 27, 2018.
200. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2461–62 (2018). The AFSCME describes itself as
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law, Janus was not required to join a union, but the union
selected by his co-workers to represent their unit nonetheless was
assigned to serve as Janus’s sole representative in collective
bargaining with the government of Illinois.201 The agency
fee—more favorably referred to by the Janus dissent as a
“fair-share payment”202—constitutes “a percentage of the union
dues”203 and is designated by statute to cover only “the costs of
the collective bargaining process, contract administration and
pursuing matters affecting wages, hours and conditions of
employment.”204 Mark Janus’s agency payment was forbidden by
law from being used by his union to cover costs “related to the
election or support of any candidate for political office.”205
Janus objected to the positions that the AFSCME took during
collective bargaining.206 He believed the union’s stances were
unwise given the fiscal crisis facing Illinois.207 Janus therefore
alleged the agency fees were tantamount to “coerced political
speech.”208

the nation’s largest and fastest growing public services employees
union. AFSCME’s members provide the vital services that make
America happen. We are nurses, corrections officers, child care
providers, EMTs, sanitation workers and more. With working
members in hundreds of different occupations and retirees across the
country, AFSCME advocates for fairness in the workplace, excellence
in public services and prosperity and opportunity for all working
families.
About AFSCME, AFSCME, https://perma.cc/MM3C-FG6B (last visited Sept. 23,
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
201. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460 (describing that unions become a unit’s
sole representative, regardless of whether or not each employee in the unit
chooses to personally become a member).
202. Id. at 2487 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 2460.
204. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/ 6(e) (2018).
205. Id. § 315/3 (g).
206. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2461 (explaining that Mr. Janus opposes
several of the public policy positions that the union advocates, including the
union’s positions on collective bargaining).
207. See id. (“[M]ark Janus believes that the Union’s ‘behavior in bargaining
does not appreciate the current fiscal crises in Illinois and does not reflect his
best interests or the interests of Illinois citizens.’”).
208. Id. at 2462.

WITHER ZAUDERER, BLOSSOM HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY?

1427

Janus’s framing209 of the substance of his expression was
strategic because political speech lies at the heart of the First
Amendment’s protection of free expression.210 Additionally,
linking speech during collective bargaining to a larger financial
predicament of a government entity was savvy because it
suggested the union’s speech constitutes a matter of public
concern.211 The Supreme Court has made it plain that such
expression is privileged in First Amendment jurisprudence.212 For
example, the Court shielded the speech of Westboro Baptist
Church members from tort claims in Snyder v. Phelps213 because
“[their] speech was at a public place on a matter of public
concern,” and thus, “that speech [was] entitled to ‘special
protection’ under the First Amendment.”214
Mark Janus’s framing of a public-sector union’s speech
during collective bargaining with a government entity as
constituting political expression and a matter of public concern
clearly paid off with the conservative five-Justice majority on the
compelled-speech issue.215 To wit, the opening paragraph of the
209. See Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured
Paradigm, 43 J. COMM. 51, 52 (1993) (asserting that “[t]o frame is to select some
aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating
text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item
described”).
210. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010)
(“[P]olitical speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by
design or inadvertence. Laws that burden political speech are ‘subject to strict
scrutiny,’ which requires the Government to prove that the restriction ‘furthers
a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.’” (quoting
Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007))); see
also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (“When a law
burdens core political speech, we apply ‘exacting scrutiny,’ and we uphold the
restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.”).
211. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S.
Ct. 2448, 2477 (2018) (discussing how disagreement between the government
and the unions about solutions to Illinois’s budget crisis is speech
“overwhelmingly of substantial public concern”).
212. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (emphasizing
that speech on matters of public concern is “at the heart” of the First
Amendment’s protection).
213. 562 U.S. 443 (2011).
214. Id. at 458.
215. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2475 (“To suggest that speech on such matters
is not of great public concern . . . is to deny reality.”).
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majority’s opinion went so far as to characterize the AFSCME’s
speech as addressing “matters of substantial public concern.”216
In reaching this characterization, the majority tracked Mark
Janus’s framing. It latched on to Illinois’s financial woes217 and
concentrated on the notion that both “how public money is
spent”218 and the views that unions express on the issues of
“education, child welfare, healthcare, and minority rights”219
during collective bargaining are of “great public importance.”220
This classification of speech during collective bargaining
between unions and government entities provided an ideal entrée
for Justice Samuel Alito, in penning the majority opinion, to
suggest that the compelled-speech obligation in Janus was of
grave First Amendment concern.221 It was not, in other words, a
compelled-disclosure case involving purely factual information.222
Alito thus cited for support canonical compelled-speech cases
noted in this Article’s Introduction, including Wooley, Barnette
and Tornillo.223 In doing so, he reasoned that laws “compelling
speech are at least as threatening”224 as those stopping
individuals from speaking. Here, he focused specifically on
statutes that would compel individuals to:

216. Id. at 2460 (emphasis added).
217. See id. at 2474–75 (acknowledging that Illinois “suffers from severe
budget problems” and that the Governor and public-sector unions “disagree
sharply about what to do about these problems”).
218. Id. at 2475.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 2476 (explaining that the importance of the topics unions
cover puts their speech in a category of public concern which the Supreme Court
has often recognized as occupying “the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values”).
222. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985) (concluding that the state was regulating only “purely factual and
uncontroversial information” related to the calculation of contingent-fee rates as
opposed to “prescib[ing] what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or forc[ing] citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein”).
223. See cases cited supra notes 7–17 and accompanying text (providing a
brief overview of each case).
224. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2464 (2018).
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• “mouth support for views they find objectionable;”225
• “voice ideas with which they disagree;” 226 and
• “express[] support for a particular set of positions on
controversial public issues.”227

In brief, Alito pounded home the point that because Janus
was an expression-of-viewpoint mandate, this justified ratcheting
up the level of scrutiny because “additional damage is done”
beyond that which occurs when the government silences
someone.228 He explained that “[f]orcing free and independent
individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable is always
demeaning,”229 and added that “[c]ompelling a person to subsidize
the speech of other private speakers raises similar First
Amendment concerns.”230
Laws like that in Illinois therefore “cannot be casually
allowed”231 and heightened scrutiny must be applied, at least in
the majority’s view.232 A general rule for scrutiny in
compelled-speech cases for the Janus majority thus appears to be
this:
If
a statute,
either
directly or
through
a
funding-subsidization mandate, compels a person to express a
viewpoint she disagrees with on an issue of public concern, then
heightened scrutiny applies.
It may be that the Janus dissent also embraces such a
general rule, but that it vehemently disagrees with the majority
that speech during collective bargaining with the government is a
matter of public concern.233 Justice Elena Kagan, authoring a
dissent joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer,
225. Id. at 2463.
226. Id. at 2464.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (explaining the majority’s
decision to apply exacting scrutiny).
233. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2496 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (observing that the
Court has previously “rejected all attempts by employees to make a ‘federal
constitutional issue’ out of basic employment matters” (internal citations
omitted)).
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and Sonia Sotomayor, concluded that such expression is decidedly
not a matter of public concern because it is “about the terms of
employment: The workplace remains both the context and the
subject matter of the expression.”234 An alternative, more narrow
and context-specific way of phrasing the dissent’s position may be
this: If speech is compelled in the context of collective bargaining
sessions between a union representing public-sector employees
and the government, then a standard of scrutiny approximating
rational basis review—not any form of heightened First
Amendment scrutiny—is appropriate.235
Viewed at a macro level, at least for the Janus majority and
from a decidedly pro-First Amendment perspective, being
compelled to subsidize the speech of public-sector unions during
collective bargaining is equally as wrong as being compelled to
pledge allegiance to the United States or to salute the American
flag (Barnette)236 or being mandated to publicly display a state
motto that conflicts with one’s religious beliefs (Wooley).237 Janus,
in brief, fits snugly with the framework of these seminal cases.
The four-Justice dissent, however, flatly rejected such
equivalency and offered a very different view of the compelled
speech in Janus.238 Specifically, Justice Kagan rebuked the
majority’s reliance on Barnette for the sweeping proposition that
“compelling speech always works a greater injury, and so always
requires a greater justification.”239 She suggested that Barnette
was an outlier case, calling it “possibly (thankfully) the most
exceptional in our First Amendment annals.”240
234. Id.
235. See id. at 2494 (advocating for the “usual deferential approach” first
articulated in Pickering v. Board of Education, 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
236. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(concluding that a forced pledge of allegiance “invades the sphere of intellect
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment” to protect).
237. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (deciding that New
Hampshire was not allowed to force citizens to become “mobile billboard[s]” for
the state’s “ideological message[s]”).
238. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S.
Ct. 2448, 2494 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[I]f anything, the First
Amendment scales tip the opposite way when (as here) the government is not
compelling actual speech, but instead compelling a subsidy that others will use
for expression.”).
239. Id. (emphasis added).
240. Id.
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Therefore, rather than viewing compelled-speech regulations
as presumptively more dangerous than ones silencing expression,
Kagan considered them of equal constitutional concern.241
Furthermore, she opined that when a case does not directly
compel speech but, as in Janus, involves the compelled
subsidization of speech, then it actually is of less worry than a
statute squelching speech.242 In the dissent’s view, when the
“government mandates a speech subsidy from a public
employee . . . it should get at least as much deference as when it
restricts the employee’s speech.”243
In summary, Janus raises key questions about the future of
compelled-speech jurisprudence: First and foremost, should
compelled-speech laws be viewed as presumptively more
dangerous than laws that stop speech, or should they be treated
as of equal concern? As suggested above, the majority and dissent
are fractured on this issue.244
Second and relatedly, is it possible to limit the reach of
Justice Alito’s assertion that “additional damage is done”245 when
speech is compelled to only situations where the speech being
compelled constitutes a viewpoint on an issue of public concern?
This limitation may be the case because Alito’s two sentences
immediately following his additional damage contention read:
In that situation, individuals are coerced into betraying their
convictions. Forcing free and independent individuals to
endorse ideas they find objectionable is always demeaning, and
for this reason, one of our landmark free speech cases said that
a law commanding “involuntary affirmation” of objected-to

241. See id. (noting that “the standard First Amendment rule is that the
‘difference between compelled speech and compelled silence’ is ‘without
constitutional significance’” (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S.
781, 796 (1988))).
242. See id. (opining that “the majority’s distinction between compelling and
restricting speech . . . lacks force” and insisting that the right to speak and the
right to refrain from speaking are “complimentary components” of the First
Amendment (quoting Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714)).
243. Id. at 2495.
244. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (setting forth the majority’s
position) and note 197 and accompanying text (setting forth the dissent’s
position).
245. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464 (majority opinion).
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beliefs would require “even more immediate and urgent
grounds” than a law demanding silence.246

In other words, might it be that Alito’s worry that
compelled-speech laws cause more harm does not apply in
scenarios factually distinct from Janus, such as cases involving
only the compelled disclosure of objective facts like Becerra? Yet
even this effort to give Alito’s words a constrained reach is
muddled because the Becerra majority, in fact, applied
heightened
First
Amendment
scrutiny
in
a
compelled-disclosure-of-factual information case.247
A third concern is that even if the majority and dissent were
to agree that heightened First Amendment scrutiny applies when
the government compels a person to express an ideological
viewpoint on a matter of public concern, the two sides in Janus
could not agree on what constitutes a matter of public concern.248
The majority found that speech during collective bargaining
sessions between a union and the government is a matter of
public concern and importance.249 The dissent strenuously
disagreed.250 In other words, even if a legal standard is agreed
upon in certain compelled-speech scenarios, that standard is
tremendously problematic if it hinges on whether speech is a
matter of public concern because “the line delineating the public
and private provinces is anything but bright,”251 thereby affording
246. See id. (emphasis added) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943)).
247. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text (describing how the
Becerra majority concluded that the regulation imposed on licensed crisis
pregnancy centers failed to pass muster under the heightened standard of
review known as intermediate scrutiny).
248. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2495 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The question is
not, as the majority seems to think, whether the public is, or should be,
interested in a government employee’s speech. Instead, the question is whether
that speech is about and directed to the workplace . . . .”).
249. See id. at 2473 (majority opinion) (“When a large number of employees
speak through their union, the category of speech that is of public concern is
greatly enlarged, and the category of speech that is of only private concern is
substantially shrunk.”).
250. See id. at 2496 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (distinguishing speech that is of
public concern with speech that is “about, in, and directed to the workplace”).
251. Clay Calvert, Defining “Public Concern” After Snyder v. Phelps: A
Pliable Standard Mingles with News Media Complicity, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 39, 40 (2012).
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ample legal leeway for the conservative and liberal Justices to
reach contrary positions on what is of public concern. The split in
Janus makes this abundantly clear.
Ultimately, the majority and dissent were thousands of legal
miles apart in their approach to the compelled-speech scenario
they confronted in Janus. While the dissent characterized the
Illinois statute as a mere “workaday economic and regulatory
policy,”252 the majority held that it “seriously impinges on First
Amendment rights”253 and thus “cannot be casually allowed.”254
Such framing, in turn, led them to apply different standards of
scrutiny and to reach different outcomes.
III. Digging Deeper into Justice Thomas’s Views on Compelled
Speech: His Masterpiece Cakeshop Concurrence
As noted earlier, Justice Thomas authored the majority
opinion in Becerra.255 Just a few weeks earlier, in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, Thomas
elaborated on his views about compelled speech in a concurrence
joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch.256 Although the Court resolved
the case on freedom of religion grounds that avoided the free
speech question,257 a brief examination of Thomas’s Masterpiece
Cakeshop concurrence sheds additional light on his and Gorsuch’s
views about compelled speech.
Thomas suggested in Masterpiece Cakeshop that it makes no
difference in compelled-speech cases whether the government is:
1) compelling expression of an opinion or a fact,258 or 2)
252. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 2464 (majority opinion).
254. Id.
255. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (identifying the five-Justice
Becerra majority).
256. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1740 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
257. See id. at 1724 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Commission’s actions here
violated the Free Exercise Clause; and its order must be set aside.”).
258. See id. at 1742 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (opining that the First
Amendment “applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement,
but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid” (internal
citations omitted)).

1434

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395 (2019)

compelling the “creation, distribution or consumption of the
speech.”259 In other words, as to the first facet, it seems Thomas
would examine a compelled factual disclosure law under the same
level of scrutiny as a law compelling expression of a political
opinion.260
Additionally, he made it clear that Colorado’s public
accommodation law compelling Jack Phillips to bake a cake that
celebrated a same-sex marriage could only pass muster if it
survived strict scrutiny.261 In brief, because Thomas believes that
“the government cannot compel speech,”262 any mandate to the
contrary must survive the Court’s highest level of review. This
proved to be the case for Thomas in Becerra regarding the
compelled-disclosure law for licensed crisis pregnancy centers,
although he held there that it was not necessary to apply strict
scrutiny because the law failed review under intermediate
scrutiny.263
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Thomas reasoned that the Colorado
law could not pass muster under strict scrutiny because it was
designed to prevent individuals such as Phillips from expressing
views that might offend others.264 Citing the Court’s ruling in the
flag-burning case of Texas v. Johnson,265 Thomas explained that
“[s]tates cannot punish protected speech because some group

259. Id.
260. See id. at 1745–46 (reasoning that both forms of speech are equally
expressive, requiring government regulations limiting either form to survive
strict scrutiny).
261. See id. (“Because Phillips’ conduct . . . was expressive, Colorado’s
public-accommodations law cannot penalize it unless the law withstands strict
scrutiny.”).
262. Id. at 1745.
263. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2375 (2018) (concluding that because California’s law did not apply to other
types of clinics, it was “not sufficiently drawn to achieve” its stated mission and
therefore could not survive intermediate scrutiny).
264. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1746 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part) (“Colorado would not be punishing Phillips if he refused to create any
custom wedding cakes; it is punishing him because he refuses to create custom
wedding cakes that express approval of same-sex marriage. In cases like this
one, our precedents demand ‘the most exacting scrutiny.’” (internal citations
omitted)).
265. 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
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finds it offensive, hurtful, stigmatic, unreasonable, or
undignified.”266
Thomas added one other point that merits noting.
Specifically, he concluded that allowing a person to issue a
disclaimer disavowing the compelled message or disassociating
oneself from it does not eliminate the First Amendment free
speech issues.267 Thomas wrote here that “[t]he Colorado Court of
Appeals also erred by suggesting that Phillips could simply post a
disclaimer, disassociating Masterpiece from any support for
same-sex marriage. Again, this argument would justify any law
compelling speech. And again, this Court has rejected it.”268
In brief, Thomas’s concurrence in Masterpiece Cakeshop
indicates his steadfast unwillingness to give laws that compel
speech of any form—be it disclosure of facts or expressions of
opinion—a judicial pass under something less than heightened
First Amendment scrutiny. The fact that Justice Gorsuch joined
him in this concurrence suggests the Trump appointee backs up
Thomas in this position.
IV. Conclusion
This Article exposed fervent disagreement between the
Supreme Court’s conservative and liberal blocs over the relevant
standard of scrutiny for analyzing compelled-speech statutes in
two 2018 cases, Becerra and Janus. Of course, if one accepts the
“realist thesis that there is more to legal decision-making than
the orderly application of positive law generalizations”269 and
acknowledges “the fallacy of the logical form as the source for
answers to legal questions,”270 then it is nearly impossible not to
contextualize these cases within the broader social and political
266. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1746 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part).
267. See id. at 1745 (reasoning that the government “cannot ‘require
speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next’” (internal
citations omitted)).
268. Id.
269. Harry W. Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism,
61 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 799 (1961).
270. E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., H. L. A. Hart’s Concept of Law in the Perspective
of American Legal Realism, 35 MODERN L. REV. 606, 606–07 (1972).

1436

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395 (2019)

frameworks that animate them—abortion271 and labor unions.272
In other words, it may be that these contentious subjects, which
some may view as dividing conservatives and liberals,
exacerbated the scrutiny problems in Becerra and Janus.273
Perhaps when less polarizing compelled-speech cases come down
the legal pike, the Court will be less fractured over scrutiny.
That, however, is speculative.
What now is certain is that the Court’s conservatives are
ready to ratchet up scrutiny in compelled-speech cases involving
both the disclosure of objectively true facts (Becerra) and those
that ostensibly compel individuals to adopt viewpoints they
oppose on issues of public concern (Janus). In the process, they
are willing to: 1) narrowly confine the reach of Zauderer, thereby
limiting the availability of what amounts to a rational basis
test,274 and 2) broadly construe, per Janus, what constitutes a
matter of public concern, thereby increasing the odds that
heightened scrutiny will apply.275 For the conservatives—and as
the title of this Article states—Zauderer withers while
heightened scrutiny blossoms. Moreover, Justice Thomas’s
concurrence in Masterpiece Cakeshop, which was addressed in
Part II, only buttresses this stance.
Conversely, the Court’s liberals want to apply the equivalent
of rational basis review in compelled-speech cases involving the:
1) compelled disclosure of only purely factual, uncontroversial
information (Becerra),276 and 2) compelled-subsidization of
public-sector union speech where money is expended only on
expression affecting collective bargaining with the government
271. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2361.
272. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448 (2018).
273. See id. at 2459 (showcasing an ideological split between the
conservative majority and the liberal dissenters); Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2367
(same).
274. See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text (addressing the Becerra
majority’s efforts to limit the scope of the rule from Zauderer).
275. See supra notes 216–219 and accompanying text (addressing the Janus
majority’s characterization of the speech that occurs during collective
bargaining between a public-sector union and a governmental entity).
276. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Breyer’s
view that the compelled-disclosure mandate in Becerra does “not warrant
heightened scrutiny”).
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(Janus).277 The first facet reflects a broad interpretation of
Zauderer, not limiting it to situations involving disclosure of facts
about goods or services offered directly by the individual or entity
being compelled to speak.278 The second embraces a deferential
approach to what Justice Kagan termed “workaday economic and
regulatory policy.”279
Given the wide range of contexts in which right-not-to-speak
claims may arise,280 it is doubtful that a single, one-size-fits-all
approach for determining scrutiny will be sufficiently nuanced
and nimble to account for all situations. Simply presuming that if
a compelled-speech law is content-based, then strict scrutiny
applies, is a decidedly blunt and sweeping approach. Why?
Because, as Justice Breyer suggested in Becerra, “much, perhaps
most, law regulates . . . speech in terms of its content.”281
On the other hand, presuming that rational basis review
applies if the Justices frame a case not as about speech, but
instead as addressing, per the Becerra dissent, “ordinary
economic and social legislation,”282 or, as the Janus dissent put it,
“workaday economic and regulatory policy,”283 is also
troublesome. What one group of Justices might classify as a case
about economic and social legislation, another might perceive
it—to use Justice Thomas’s phrase in Becerra—as involving a
full-scale “speech as speech”284 dispute.
277. See supra notes 236–241 and accompanying text (summarizing Justice
Kagan’s argument for applying a more relaxed, deferential standard of review in
Janus).
278. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2387 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
The majority concludes that Zauderer does not apply because the
disclosure ‘in no way relates to the services that licensed clinics
provide’ . . . . But information about state resources for family
planning, prenatal care, and abortion is related to the services that
licensed clinics provide . . . . Regardless, Zauderer is not so limited.
279. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
280. See cases cited supra notes 7–19 and accompanying text (discussing
right-not-to-speak Supreme Court cases in a variety of social, political, and
religious contexts).
281. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 2381.
283. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2501 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
284. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374 (majority opinion).
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Therefore, rather than adopting a rather reductionist
formula for fathoming the correct standard of scrutiny in
compelled-speech cases, one might articulate multiple criteria or
variables for courts to consistently and holistically consider
during the scrutiny determination. Using variants of some of the
labels noted in Part II, Section A,285 these factors might include
analysis of:
1) Whether a law compels a speaker to express or embrace a
subjective viewpoint with which she disagrees on any given topic
or, alternatively, whether it compels conveyance of objectively
true facts that are reasonably related to a speaker’s goods or
services.286 The former type of compulsion militates in favor of a
higher level of scrutiny than the latter, per the collective logic of
Barnette, Wooley, and Zauderer.
2) Whether the legislative intent of a law is to enhance the
overall amount of information in the marketplace of ideas that is
reasonably related to the speaker’s goods or services so that
recipients of the speech can make better informed choices
(knowledge-enhancement rationale) or, instead, whether the
intent is to prevent deception by private speakers that otherwise
would be reasonably likely to arise in the absence of the
compelled speech (prevention-of-deception rationale), akin to
Zauderer’s interest in preventing deception about contingency fee
arrangements.287
A
law
premised
on
the
former,
knowledge-enhancement rationale arguably merits analysis
under a higher level of scrutiny because the government is not
merely attempting to thwart deception by private actors but is
actively intervening to add separate information that it feels is
essential.288 In other words, the knowledge-enhancement
justification gives the state power to tilt the marketplace of
285. See discussion supra Part II.A (providing a brief overview of labels used
to characterize compelled-speech laws).
286. See supra notes 124–128 and accompanying text (discussing the
“objectively true facts” label).
287. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (discussing the
“knowledge-enhancement” and “prevention-of-deception” rationales).
288. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (suggesting that there is
a difference between a governmental interest in curbing the spread of false,
misleading information and an interest in sending its own message to the
public).
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ideas—not simply correct it—with information it believes is
important.
3) Whether conveyance of the compelled speech significantly
harms the ability of the speaker to effectively and clearly convey
a political, moral, or religious belief,289 or alternatively, whether
it detrimentally affects only the economic and fiscal interests of
the speaker. This distinction is grounded in the Court’s view that
it “is wrong to equate the judicial review applicable to the
regulation of a constitutionally protected personal liberty with
the less strict review applicable where . . . economic legislation is
at issue.”290 The former type of compelled-speech mandate should
require greater scrutiny because it affects a person’s beliefs and
values, not simply his or her pocketbook. This factor is also
suggested by Becerra, where the effectiveness of crisis pregnancy
centers to convey their anti-abortion message and thereby
influence women to carry a baby to term was arguably
diminished by having to convey information that abortions were
available at little to no cost.291 Those financial facts about
abortions might steer some women toward abortions and away
from the speaker’s pro-life position. Put differently, this factor
entails
consideration
of
the
message-diluting
or
message-adulterating
impact
of
the
compelled-speech
regulation.292
4) Whether the compelled-speech regulation is intended to
bring health and safety benefits for the audience that receives it.
If that is the legislative intent, the Court must consider actual
289. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707 (1977) (involving
government-mandated license plates that were “repugnant to [some residents’]
moral and religious beliefs”).
290. Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016).
291. See Nat’l Inst. Of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361,
2371 (2018)
[L]icensed clinics must provide a government-drafted script about the
availability of state-sponsored services, as well as contact information
for how to obtain them. One of those services is abortion—the very
practice that petitioners are devoted to opposing. By requiring
petitioners to inform women how they can obtain state-subsidized
abortions—at the same time petitioners try to dissuade women from
choosing that option—the licensed notice plainly “alters the content”
of petitioners’ speech.
292. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text (discussing the
“message-diluting” rationale).
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evidence suggesting tangible health and safety benefits of the
legislation like in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt,293 where
the Court placed “considerable weight upon evidence and
argument presented in judicial proceedings”294 regarding the
alleged health and safety benefits to women of two Texas laws295
limiting access to abortions. The Court struck down the laws
partly because they provided “few, if any, health benefits for
women.”296 In brief, if a health-and-safety argument is made in
favor of compelling speech, then the Court should apply a level of
scrutiny that requires examining the evidence that ostensibly
supports that argument.
These, of course, are merely preliminary suggestions of
criteria for judicial use when determining the level of scrutiny in
compelled-speech cases. They are not meant to be exclusive of
other variables or factors. Furthermore, they are offered here
solely as springboards for academic and judicial debate and
consideration.
Regardless, however, of whether the Court ignores, rejects, or
adopts them, it is crucial for the Justices to better define and
then consistently apply at least some concrete variables for
deciding the correct level of scrutiny in compelled-speech cases.
Doing so would add predictability and rigor to this now confusing
facet of First Amendment jurisprudence that has sprawled since
Barnette was handed down more than seventy-five years ago.297
Moreover, it might bolster the Court’s legitimacy298—something
likely damaged by the contentious confirmation hearings in 2018
293. 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016).
294. Id. at 2310.
295. One law required physicians who perform abortions to have admitting
privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the facility where they perform
abortions. Id. at 2300. The second statute required facilities that perform
abortions to have the same medical equipment necessary to be classified as an
ambulatory surgical center. Id.
296. Id. at 2298.
297. See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text (detailing the
historical—and often confusing—evolution of Supreme Court right-not-to-speak
jurisprudence).
298. Legitimacy here refers to what Justice Elena Kagan recently described
as the public perceiving that the Court’s “decision-making has a kind of
integrity to it” and believing that the Court is “not simply just an extension of
politics.” Robert Barnes & Carol D. Leonnig, Partisan Mud Could End Up
Tarnishing High Court’s Halo, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2018, at A8.

WITHER ZAUDERER, BLOSSOM HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY?

1441

for Justice Brett Kavanaugh299—that is further sapped when it
fractures along perceived political lines. Such fracturing, as this
Article made evident, is precisely what happened in the
compelled-speech cases of Becerra and Janus,300 leaving the
Court’s jurisprudence in this realm both disorderly and
partisanly pliable.

299. See, e.g., Megan McArdle, There Is No Cleaning Up This Kavanaugh
Mess, WASH. POST, OCT. 7, 2018, AT A23 (“Putting Kavanaugh on the Court under
these circumstances has outraged the left half of the political spectrum and
undermined the already shaky legitimacy of the Court, and it will touch off a
political firestorm if Kavanaugh becomes the fifth vote to overturn Roe v.
Wade.”); Jason L. Riley, Upward Mobility: Democrats Rage Against the
Judiciary, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2018, at A17 (quoting U.S. Senator Dianne
Feinstein, a Democrat from California, for the proposition that Brett
Kavanaugh’s confirmation “undermines the legitimacy of the Supreme Court”).
300. See supra note 273 and accompanying text (noting the glaring partisan
divide between the majority and the dissent in Becerra and Janus).

